Vicarious Liability: A case study in the failure of general principles? by Beuermann C
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Beuermann C.  
Vicarious Liability: A case study in the failure of general principles?.  
Journal of Professional Negligence 2017, 33(3), 179-192. 
 
 
Copyright: 
©Copyright 2017 Bloomsbury Professional. This is the authors’ accepted manuscript of an article that 
may be downloaded for personal use only. Any other use requires prior permission of the author and the 
publisher.  
Date deposited:   
03/07/2017 
Embargo release date: 
01 March 2019  
Vicarious Liability:  A case study in the failure of general principles? 
Christine Beuermann 
 
1. Introduction 
Are cases to be determined from the ‘bottom-up’, by reference to specific principles derived 
from the facts of decided cases, or from the ‘top-down’, by reference to more general 
principles found within the legal system?  This dilemma is not unique to vicarious liability 
but is of particular significance given the long standing failure of the courts to identify a 
convincing justification1 that both shapes and informs the test for determining when an 
employer should be held strictly liable2 for the wrongdoing of an employee.  Consideration of 
the issue is also timely given the now [in]famous declaration of Lord Phillips in Various 
Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society3 that ‘the law of vicarious liability is on the 
move’.4   
  Concerned by the rate of change and the risk of misstep, the High Court of Australia 
expressly considered the question of whether priority should be given to the facts of decided 
cases or general principles when determining vicarious liability in the recent case of Prince 
Alfred College Inc. v ADC.5  A majority of the High Court concluded that the starting point 
should be the facts of decided cases, favouring the more ‘orthodox route of considering 
whether the approach taken in decided cases furnishes a solution to further cases as they 
arise’.6  This was in stark contrast to the approach perceived to have been taken by the UK 
Supreme Court in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc,7 decided just seven months 
earlier.  In the High Court’s view, the Supreme Court determined whether to impose 
vicarious liability on the employer in that case by considering general principles such as 
‘justice’ and ‘fairness’ rather than identifying and applying any specific legal principle or 
principles derived from factually similar cases of vicarious liability.  To the extent that such 
general principles were not expressly informed by the cases, the High Court feared the 
approach had led the Supreme Court into error. 
  This short article explores the decision of the High Court of Australia in Prince Alfred 
College and considers the importance of the facts of decided cases to the development of the 
law of vicarious liability more generally.  The decision is itself limited by its own facts and 
pleading anomalies.  It is necessary to understand that context to appreciate some of the more 
unusual features of the decision.  For instance, the framing of the pleadings in Prince Alfred 
College returned the High Court of Australia to more traditional formulations of the heavily 
criticised Salmond test for vicarious liability.  The framing of the pleadings also prevented 
the High Court from exploring more fully the interrelationship between vicarious liability and 
liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’, an additional and similarly under-
                                                            
1 These difficulties are accurately described in the first part of the following article:  Jason Neyers, ‘A theory of 
vicarious liability’ (2004) 43 Alberta Law Review 287.  For a more expansive consideration see:  P Atiyah, 
Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (Butterworths, 1967) and P Giliker, Vicarious Liability in Tort: A 
Comparative Perspective (CUP, 2010). 
2 Defined for these purposes as liability imposed regardless of personal wrongdoing by the defendant; Peter 
Cane, ‘Responsibility and fault: a relational and functional approach to responsibility’ in Peter Cane and John 
Gardner (eds), Relating to Responsibility (Hart, 2001) 81, 99. 
3 [2013] 2 AC 1. 
4 Ibid at [19]. 
5 [2016] HCA 37 (‘Prince Alfred College’). 
6 Ibid at [46]. 
7 [2016] AC 677 (‘Mohamud’). 
explained form of strict liability for the wrongdoing of another in tort.  Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, the High Court’s focus on the facts of decided cases can be seen as an important 
first step in identifying a principled basis for a discrete and fact-specific form of strict 
liability for the wrongdoing of another in tort (whether that form of strict liability is 
ultimately called vicarious liability or something else).  This specific form of strict liability 
arises where an employer places an employee in a position of ‘authority, power, trust, control 
[or] intimacy’8 in respect of the plaintiff or claimant, in turn creating the potential for the 
employee to abuse that ‘authority, power, trust, control [or] intimacy’.  Due to an over 
reliance on general principles, this specific form of strict liability for the wrongdoing of 
another in tort has, to date, escaped identification by the courts.   
2. The Facts 
Prince Alfred College is an addition to the long line of cases brought by students who have 
been sexually abused by a teacher (or some other employee) against the school they were 
attending when the abuse occurred.9  The perpetrator in Prince Alfred College was Dean 
Rollo Bain, a boarding house master.  Bain was one of three boarding house masters 
employed by the College and was rostered on two to three nights per week.  Over a period of 
about 8 months in 1962, Bain used his position as boarding house master to go into the year 8 
dormitory to sexually abuse the plaintiff under the guise of settling the plaintiff and other 
boarders by reading them a story in bed after lights-out.10  The evidence suggested that it was 
not the usual practice of other boarding house masters employed by the College to go into the 
dormitories during this time.  Instead, primary responsibility for supervising the boarders 
when preparing for bed and after lights-out was borne by student prefects. 
At trial, the fact of the abuse was not disputed.  The abuse had been discovered late in 
1962 when the plaintiff confided in a friend who told the College chaplain.  Bain was 
dismissed by the College shortly thereafter.  The College made no attempt at the time to 
contact the police and the boarders were told not to discuss the matter either amongst 
themselves or outside the College.  When the abuse was eventually brought to police 
attention in 2005, Bain was arrested.  He pleaded guilty to all charges. 
The principal complicating factor in the case was the length of time that had passed 
between the abuse and the commencement of the legal proceedings.  A number of key 
witnesses had died, including the headmaster, the senior master and the school chaplain.11  
Other witnesses, including the senior housemaster, were ill and unable to give evidence.12  
This made it very difficult to determine the ‘processes in employing Bain, the instructions to 
and supervision of Bain, the practices in the boarding house and the school’s response to 
Bain’s conduct and dismissal’.13   
The full extent of the plaintiff’s injuries also took a considerable period of time to 
materialise.  The plaintiff was first diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder in 1996, 
some 30 years after the abuse.  The disorder was triggered when he enrolled his own son at 
the College and the plaintiff experienced flashbacks after attending College events.  The 
plaintiff approached the College that same year and, after receiving assurances that no student 
                                                            
8 (n 5) at [82]. 
9 Including, Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215, Bazley v Curry (1999) 174 DLR (4th) 45 and New South 
Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 (‘Lepore’). 
10 There was also one occasion where abuse occurred off school premises; [2015] SASCFC 161 at [57]. 
11 (n 5) at [24]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 (n 10) at [139]. 
at the College would again be subjected to such abuse, reached a financial settlement.  He 
reached a further financial settlement with Bain in 1998.  At the time of these settlements, the 
plaintiff’s prognosis for recovering from his post-traumatic stress disorder was relatively 
good.14  Subsequently, however, his condition deteriorated.  In 2003, the plaintiff became 
suicidal and was admitted to a psychiatric hospital.  There were similar episodes in the 
following years and in 2007 the plaintiff was told he was unlikely to recover or return to 
managing his various small businesses.  It was not until this point that the plaintiff 
commenced legal proceedings against the College.  
 
3. Case history 
The significant delay in commencing legal proceedings and the resulting difficulties arising 
from that delay meant that the procedural question of whether an extension to the applicable 
limitation period15 should be allowed largely overtook the plaintiff’s substantive legal claims.  
The trial judge found that the College ‘would suffer actual prejudice of the greatest 
magnitude in having to defend the plaintiff’s claim due to the extent of the delay’.16  Of 
particular concern were the difficulties in obtaining evidence as to the exact nature of Bain’s 
duties at the College during the relevant period.  Although overturned by the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of South Australia, the trial judge’s refusal to grant an extension of the 
limitation period was ultimately upheld by the High Court of Australia. 
Having upheld the trial judge’s refusal to grant an extension of the limitation period, 
five of the seven judges of the High Court of Australia (in the form of a single majority 
judgment17) proceeded to comment on two of the substantive claims brought by the plaintiff; 
the claim that the College should be held vicariously liable for the sexual abuse perpetrated 
by Bain and the alternative claim that the sexual abuse perpetrated by Bain amounted to a 
breach of the so-called ‘non-delegable duty of care’ owed by the College to the plaintiff.18  
The majority’s decision to comment on these claims is at odds with their earlier 
admonishment of the trial judge for so doing when her refusal to extend the limitation period 
rendered the claims nugatory.19  It is explicable, however, in light of the earlier decision of 
the High Court of Australia in New South Wales v Lepore.20 
Lepore is a notoriously difficult case.21  Decided shortly after the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Bazley v Curry22 and the House of Lords in Lister v Hesley 
Hall,23 it was the High Court of Australia’s first opportunity to consider the circumstances in 
which a school might be held strictly liable for the abuse (sexual or otherwise) of a student by 
                                                            
14 Although the notes of the psychologist the plaintiff was attending at this time were accidentally destroyed; 
(n 10) at [24]. 
15 Limitation of Actions Act (SA) 1936, s 48. 
16 (n 10) at [139]. 
17 French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ. 
18 Various claims were also brought by the claimant for negligence by the College itself in appointing Bain, 
supervising Bain and responding to the allegation of abuse by Bain. 
19 (n 5) at [9]. 
20 (n 9). 
21 Prue Vines, ‘NSW v Lepore; Samin v Queensland; Rich v Queensland – Schools’ Responsibility for Teachers’ 
Sexual Assault:  Non-delegable Duty and Vicarious Liability’ (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 
612; Jane Wangmann ‘Liability for Institutional Child Sexual Assault: where does Lepore leave Australia?’ 
(2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 169. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
a teacher.  Six separate judgments were delivered in the three co-joined appeals.24  Four of 
the seven judges found that it was possible to hold a school strictly liable, in certain 
circumstances, for the abuse of a student by a teacher.  Despite the veneer of consensus, there 
was no agreement between these judges as to the basis upon which such strict liability might 
be imposed.25   
Two of the judges thought a school could be held vicariously liable for the abuse of 
the teacher.  Justice Kirby followed the lead of the House of Lords in Lister and held that 
vicarious liability could be imposed when there was a sufficiently ‘close connection’ between 
the abuse and the employment.26  Chief Justice Gleeson was concerned that the ‘close 
connection’ test was too broad, but was prepared to impose vicarious liability in the more 
limited circumstances where the employee was ‘invested with a high degree of power and 
intimacy’27 in respect of the student.  In contrast, McHugh J held that abuse of a student by a 
teacher could amount to a breach of the ‘non-delegable duty of care’ owed by the school to 
the student.  Justice Gaudron held somewhat unorthodoxly that such liability could be 
justified on the basis of estoppel.28 
Ultimately, evidential deficiencies and pleading errors meant that the appeals in 
Lepore were resolved largely on procedural grounds.  The failure of the High Court of 
Australia to reach a majority position as to the basis upon which a school might be held 
strictly liable for the abuse of a student by a teacher made life very difficult, however, for 
lower court judges.  The majority in Prince Alfred College therefore found it necessary to 
provide some guidance to the lower courts by commenting on the plaintiff’s substantive 
claims in vicarious liability and liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’.29   Such 
guidance was strictly dicta.  As emphasised by the minority judges,30 the decision in Prince 
Alfred College ‘does not mark out the exact boundaries of any principle’.31 
 
4. Liability for breach of a non-delegable duty of care 
The first substantive claim addressed by the majority judges in Prince Alfred College was 
liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’.  This argument received short shrift.   
Six of the seven judges in Lepore had found that liability for breach of a ‘non-
delegable duty of care’ could not extend to intentional wrongdoing, such as the sexual abuse 
of a child.32  To overturn this decision, it was therefore necessary for the plaintiff in Prince 
Alfred College to address the court on why it should reconsider a previous decision.33  This 
                                                            
24 Samin v Queensland and Rich v Queensland (2003) 212 CLR 511. 
25 For further discussion of case, see C. Beuermann, ‘Conferred Authority Strict Liability and Institutional Child 
Sexual Abuse (2015) 37(1) Sydney Law Review 113. 
26 Lepore (n 9) at 622. 
27 Ibid 546. 
28 Ibid 561. 
29 (n 5) at [10]. 
30 Gageler and Gordon JJ. 
31 (n 5) at [131]. 
32 The UK Supreme Court is currently considering the question of whether liability for breach of a ‘non-
delegable duty of care’ can extend to intentional wrongdoing in the pending appeal of NA v Nottinghamshire CC 
(UKSC 2016/0004).  See also P Morgan, ‘Fostering, vicarious liability, non-delegable duties and intentional 
torts’ (2016) 132 Law Quarterly Review 399. 
33 Ibid at [36]. 
the plaintiff failed to do.  The plaintiff’s claim for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ 
was consequently dismissed without consideration of the claim’s merits. 
Although the majority in Prince Alfred College spent little more than a paragraph 
discussing liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ in their judgment, a much 
broader discussion of the claim had been entertained at the hearing.  During the hearing, it 
became evident that the formulation of the doctrine of liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable 
duty of care’ advanced by the plaintiff rested on the now outdated fiction that the physical 
abuse perpetrated by Bain could be attributed to the College so that the College could be 
viewed as personally engaging in wrongdoing.34  This view of liability for breach of a ‘non-
delegable duty of care’ is out-of-step with more modern formulations of the doctrine that can 
be found in the various judgments in Lepore and the recent decision of the UK Supreme 
Court in Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association.35  Those formulations suggest that, to 
the extent liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty of care’ is imposed regardless of any 
actual wrongdoing by the defendant, it is a form of strict liability.36  
When viewed as a form of strict liability, it becomes necessary to delineate the boundary 
between liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty’ and the other form of strict liability for 
the wrongdoing of another in tort, vicarious liability.  Delineating that boundary proved 
particularly difficult for the judges in Lepore.  Since the formulation of the doctrine of 
liability for breach of a ‘non-delegable duty’ advanced by the plaintiff denied even the 
potential for the two forms of liability to conflict, the plaintiff was unable to offer the High 
Court of Australia any assistance in resolving this difficulty.  This failure explains the 
reluctance of the majority to engage with the substance of the claim. 
 
5. Vicarious liability 
The plaintiff’s formulation of the doctrine of vicarious liability in Prince Alfred College was 
similarly outdated.  The plaintiff though was not alone in presenting this formulation, with 
both parties seeking to take the High Court of Australia back to its 1949 decision in Deatons 
Pty Ltd v Flew.37  The majority in Prince Alfred College proved more receptive to this 
attempt to reinstate a more traditional formulation of the law.  The decision of the UK 
Supreme Court in Mohamud, handed down just one month prior to the High Court of 
Australia granting leave to appeal in Prince Alfred College, appears to have been a significant 
factor. 
Mohamud stands as the current high watermark of an employer being held vicariously 
liable for the intentional wrongdoing of an employee.  A customer at a Morrisons’ petrol 
station had asked the employee at the payment kiosk for assistance in printing out a 
document.  The employee refused the assistance, and ordered the customer out of the petrol 
station whilst shouting racial abuse.  Not content with the customer leaving, the employee 
then followed the customer back to his car (which was parked in the petrol station forecourt) 
and physically assaulted him, causing serious physical injuries.  The employee had resisted 
all attempts by his supervisor to stop the attack.  Despite the apparent racial motivations for 
the assault, Morrisons was held vicariously liable.  In the Supreme Court’s view, there was a 
                                                            
34 Prince Alfred College Inc. v ADC [201] HCATrans 163. 
35 [2014] AC 537. 
36 Ibid at [22] (Lord Sumption) and Lepore (n 9) at [257] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).  For the definition of strict 
liability adopted for the purposes of this article see (n 2). 
37 (1949) 79 CLR 370 (‘Deatons’). 
sufficiently ‘close connection’ between the attack and the employment to justify the 
imposition of vicarious liability.38  Specifically, the Supreme Court found that there was an 
‘unbroken sequence of events’ between the attack and the ‘field of activities’ assigned to the 
employee, making it ‘fair’ and ‘just’ to impose vicarious liability for the assault.39 
As already noted, the majority in Prince Alfred College found the decision of the UK 
Supreme Court in Mohamud problematic.  First, it was not easily reconciled with the earlier 
decision of the High Court of Australia in Deatons (the case identified by both parties in 
Prince Alfred College as espousing the current law of vicarious liability in Australia).  The 
facts of the case are relatively well-known.  A barmaid, in response to alleged harassment by 
a drunken customer, accidentally threw not only the beer, but the beer glass, blinding the 
customer in one eye.  The employer escaped vicarious liability on the basis that the barmaid’s 
conduct was an ‘independent act of personal retribution’40 and therefore outside the course of 
employment.  In Mohamud, vicarious liability was imposed notwithstanding that the conduct 
of the employee could be similarly described and the connection between the employment 
and the assault was arguably even more tenuous since the customer was leaving the 
employer’s premises and no longer enjoying or intending to enjoy the employer’s services at 
the time of the assault (whereas the customer in Deatons was still sitting at the bar and 
continuing to drink at the time of the assault).41   
The majority in Prince Alfred College was also concerned more generally with the 
approach taken by the UK Supreme Court in Mohamud to determining vicarious liability.  In 
the majority’s view, this approach was unduly broad.42  In the cases leading up to Mohamud, 
the Supreme Court had moved the test for determining vicarious liability away from the 
traditional ‘course of employment’ Salmond test that was engaged in Deatons, to the 
requirement that there be a sufficiently ‘close connection’ between the employment and the 
employee’s wrongdoing for vicarious liability to be imposed.43   The facts of Mohamud 
demonstrated the ease with which this requirement could be satisfied; the connection between 
the employee’s ‘field of activities’ and the assault being little more than causal on the facts of 
the case.44  The majority in Prince Alfred College was of the view that a causal connection 
could not itself explain the imposition of vicarious liability.  The decision could therefore 
only be explained by an over-reliance on general principles such as ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’.45  
This had not previously been the approach to determining vicarious liability in Australia,46 
and, in the majority’s view, should not now become the approach to determining vicarious 
liability in Australia.  Instead, the majority in Prince Alfred College confirmed that whether 
vicarious liability could be imposed on an employer for the intentional wrongdoing of an 
                                                            
38 (n 5) at [47]. 
39 Ibid. 
40 (n 37) at 378. 
41 Despite Lord Toulson’s attempt to strengthen the connection by the employee threatening the customer to 
never come back; (n 5) at [47]. 
42 (n 5) at [45]. 
43 Starting with Lister (n 9). 
44 (n 5) at [72]. 
45 Lord Neuberger, ‘Some Thoughts on Principles Governing the Law of Torts’, speech given at Singapore 
Conference on Protecting Business and Economic Interests, 19 August 2016 at 
https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-160819-03.pdf (last accessed 30 November 2016). 
46 (n 5) at [45]. 
employee was to be determined in accordance with a specific principle derived from a close 
analysis of the decided cases.47 
To this end, the majority in Prince Alfred College conducted a detailed analysis of the 
cases in which an employer had previously been held vicariously liable for the intentional 
wrongdoing of an employee in order to identify the specific fact or facts of those cases that 
attracted liability. The analysis showed that the cases shared a common feature; in each case, 
the defendant employer had placed the employee in a position of ‘authority, power, trust, 
control [or] intimacy’48 in respect of the claimant.   In Lloyd v Grace, Smith & Co,49 for 
instance, the defendant firm of solicitors was held vicariously liable when the managing clerk 
employed by the firm to conduct its conveyancing business had transferred two properties 
owned by a client of the firm into his own name.   The managing clerk was able to do this as 
the firm had conferred authority on the clerk to receive documents, such as title deeds, from 
clients on its behalf.  The employee in Morris v C W Martin & Sons Ltd50 had similarly been 
conferred authority to receive property from clients on behalf of the employer.  In that case, 
the defendant dry cleaner was held vicariously liable when the employee absconded with a 
mink stole deposited with the employee for dry cleaning.  In the long line of child sexual 
assault cases, of which Prince Alfred College was an example, the teachers had been placed 
by the schools in a position of power in respect of the students, being conferred authority by 
the school to direct the behaviour of the students and to discipline the students should they 
not comply.   
Having identified the common feature of the cases in which vicarious liability had 
been imposed on an employer for the intentional wrongdoing by an employee, the majority in 
Prince Alfred College then sought to derive the relevant legal principal.  They were assisted 
in this task (though perhaps misguidedly) by the decision in Deatons, to which they had been 
referred by the parties.  Justice Dixon had commented in that case that the wrongful conduct 
in Deatons was not conduct ‘to which the ostensible performance of [the] master’s work 
gives occasion’.  Instead, the employee’s work as a barmaid provided merely an opportunity 
to engage in such wrongful conduct.  Seizing on this distinction, the majority suggested that 
an employer provides the occasion, rather than just the opportunity, for wrongdoing where 
the employer places the employee in a position of ‘authority, power, trust, control [or] 
intimacy’51 in respect of the plaintiff.   The creation of this ‘special relationship’ between the 
employee and the plaintiff by the employer could suffice, in the majority’s view, to determine 
that intentional wrongdoing occurred in the course of employment where the employee 
subsequently ‘takes advantage’ of that relationship to engage in such wrongdoing.52 
The majority was affirmed in this conclusion by an analysis of the cases in which 
vicarious liability had NOT been imposed on an employer for the intentional wrongdoing of 
an employee.  In the child sexual assault cases, for instance, schools had been held 
vicariously liable for sexual assaults of students committed by teachers, but not other 
employees such as bakers and gardeners.53  Unlike teachers, neither bakers nor gardeners are 
generally vested with authority by a school to direct the behaviour of students.54  As the 
                                                            
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid at [82]. 
49 [1912] AC 716. 
50 [1966] 1 QB 716. 
51 (n 5) at [82]. 
52 Ibid at [81]. 
53 B v Order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (2005) 258 DLR (4th) 385 and G(ED) v Hammer (2003) 230 
DLR (4th) 554. 
54 G(ED) ibid at 557-8 (McLachlin CJ). 
barmaid in Deatons had not been given any responsibility for crowd control within the pub 
and had not been vested with any other special power or authority in respect of the customer, 
it could be analysed in similar terms.  The only case which defied this analysis was the recent 
decision of the UK Supreme Court in Mohamud.  For this reason, the majority in Prince 
Alfred College suggested it may have been wrongly decided:55 
There were no special features of his employment which would be associated with the offending.  His 
want of authority, power or control over customers was confirmed by the fact that he was clearly subject 
to supervision.  It is apparent that the carrying out of his employment duties did not provide the 
‘occasion’ for the offending. 
All that was left for the majority in Prince Alfred College was to apply the newly 
devised legal principle for imposing vicarious liability on an employer for the intentional 
wrongdoing of an employee to the facts of the case.  The evidential difficulties resulting from 
the passage of time, however, meant that it was almost impossible to ascertain sufficient 
details of Bain’s employment to be able to determine whether the school in Prince Alfred 
College did anything more than provide a mere opportunity for Bain’s wrongdoing.  It was 
for this reason that the majority was ultimately reluctant to overturn the trial judge’s refusal 
to extend the limitation period on the facts of the case. 
 
6. The importance of facts 
Prince Alfred College stands as a cautionary tale for the increasingly prevalent search by 
courts and legal academics for disembodied general principles to guide the development of 
the law.56  There are several useful lessons that can be drawn from the decision of the 
majority of the High Court of Australia about the importance of the facts of decided cases to 
the development of the law of vicarious liability. 
(a) Lesson One – Decisions in individual cases are shaped by the facts and the parties’ 
pleadings 
The decision of the majority of the High Court of Australia in Prince Alfred College is 
problematic and will be criticised.  At best, the distinction between forms of employment that 
provide the ‘occasion’ as opposed to the ‘opportunity’ for wrongdoing by an employee is 
very fine; at worst, it is semantic.  By adding yet another set of circumstances that might 
satisfy the ‘course of employment’ element of the Salmond test retained by the High Court of 
Australia for the purposes of determining vicarious liability, the High Court has also done 
little to address the historic definitional difficulties that led ultimately to the test’s 
abandonment in Canada and England and Wales.  Such criticisms, however, are a product of 
the specific facts of the case and the nature of the parties’ pleadings.   
 To start, Prince Alfred College was a largely inappropriate vehicle to address the 
shortcomings of Lepore and resolve the question of whether a school can be held strictly 
liable for the sexual abuse of a student by a teacher in Australia.  Several key witnesses had 
died, the period of time from the abuse to the trial made evidence gathering difficult and the 
plaintiff had received previous settlements in respect of the claim.   
 Concerns about the potential expansionary effects of the decision of the UK Supreme 
Court in Mohamud also affected how the pleadings in the case were drawn.  The conservative 
                                                            
55 (n 5) at [73]. 
56 ‘Corrective justice’ might be seen as another example of such a general principle; Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea 
of Private Law (OUP, 2012). 
nature of those pleadings left the High Court of Australia little room to develop the law of 
vicarious liability beyond the constraints of the traditional Salmond test.  In the 
circumstances, all the High Court could do was flag how the law might develop should the 
High Court be presented with a case in the future in which it could examine the merits of 
imposing strict liability on a school for the sexual abuse of a student by a teacher free from 
procedural and pleading difficulties.   
The conservative nature of the pleadings also prevented the High Court from fully 
exploring the interrelationship between vicarious liability and liability for breach of a ‘non-
delegable duty of care’.  Despite the willingness of several judges at the hearing to identify 
the boundary between the two forms of liability, there was little opportunity to rationalise the 
law and produce a coherent picture of strict liability for the wrongdoing of another in tort 
more generally given that the pleadings failed to recognise both forms of liability as ‘strict’. 
(b) Lesson Two – In the absence of a convincing justification, vicarious liability should 
be determined by reference to specific legal principles derived from the facts of 
decided cases 
Despite its difficulties, the real value of the majority’s decision in Prince Alfred College lies 
in the attention drawn by the majority to the methodology used by judges when determining 
vicarious liability.  Vicarious liability is an exceptional form of liability.  It is imposed 
regardless of personal wrongdoing by the defendant employer.  There should consequently be 
a very clear justification for any expansion of that liability.  By choosing to focus on 
methodology, the majority in Prince Alfred College were able to expressly consider whether 
the expansion of vicarious liability flagged by Lord Phillips in Various Claimants57 was an 
intentional development of the law, or whether the expansion had been an inadvertent result 
of a shift in judicial decision making method.58  Specifically, a shift from the traditional 
‘bottom-up’ method of deriving specific legal principles from a detailed examination of the 
facts of decided cases to a more ‘top-down’ approach of deciding cases by reference to 
broader, general principles.  After reviewing the decision of the UK Supreme Court in 
Mohamud, the majority in Prince Alfred College were clearly concerned that any expansion 
was more accidental than deliberate. 
A review of the reasoning process of Lord Toulson, who gave judgment for the 
majority in Mohamud,59 confirms that the majority in Prince Alfred College had reason to be 
concerned.  It is not that Lord Toulson disregarded the decided cases.  Having considered the 
historic development of vicarious liability more generally, Lord Toulson did indeed conduct a 
                                                            
57 (n 3) at [19]. For further commentary on Mohamud see:  D Ryan, ‘”Close Connection” and “Akin to 
Employment”: perspectives on 50 years of radical developments in vicarious liability’ [2016] Irish Jurist 239; 
J Plunkett, ‘Taking stock of vicarious liability’ (2016) Law Quarterly Review 556; P Morgan ‘Certainty in 
vicarious liability: a quest for a chimaera? (2016) Cambridge Law Journal 202. 
58 Similar concerns were recently expressed by O’Donnell J of the Supreme Court of Ireland in Hickey v 
McGowan [2017] IESC 6, [42] (with whom Denham CJ, MacMenamin and Dunne J agreed):  ‘Vicarious 
liability is not on the move, at least not of its own volition.  If it moves, it is by the decision of judges which 
must be reasoned and justified.  The law of vicarious liability was relatively stable, narrow and well understood 
for most of the 20th century until recently, and much if not all of the development of the law has occurred 
because of the necessity of addressing the phenomenon of historic sexual abuse of children in an institutional 
context.  There is in my view no discernible movement in the common law world to expand vicarious liability, 
and therefore liability without fault, on the basis merely of an ability to pay alone, and any such development 
would raise fundamental issues.  Instead, there has been a number of carefully analysed, but not always 
consistent, attempts in the courts of the highest level in the common world, to provide a framework in which to 
address claims of historic sexual abuse.’ 
59 Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC, Baroness Hale of Richmond DPSC, Lord Dyson MR and Lord Reed JSC 
were all in agreement. 
review of the cases in which a claimant had sought to hold an employer vicariously liable for 
an assault occasioned by an employee.  This review showed that the decisions reached in the 
cases were largely inconsistent; with an employer sometimes being held vicariously liable for 
such an assault but not always.  Especially telling in this regard, was a decision of the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal decided just one year before the High Court of Australia decision in 
Deatons.60  Both cases involved assaults by bar staff on customers in pubs.  Unlike the High 
Court of Australia, however, the New Zealand Court of Appeal imposed vicarious liability on 
the employer in the case.  It is what Lord Toulson did next, however, that is critical.  Rather 
than delve deeper into the cases to see if there were any factual distinctions that might explain 
the different results, Lord Toulson concluded that the inconsistency was the product of the 
well-known deficiencies of the traditional ‘scope of employment’ Salmond test.  As such 
deficiencies had ultimately led to the abandonment of the ‘scope of employment’ test, Lord 
Toulson formed the view that such cases were of limited utility. 
On this basis, Lord Toulson was able to put the decided cases largely to one side 
when determining how the ‘close connection’ test should be interpreted and applied.  Keen 
not to repeat the mistakes of the past, he was reluctant to recognise any specific principle as 
underpinning the ‘close connection’ test.  Quoting Kant, he noted:  ‘Out of the crooked 
timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made.’61  He was also reluctant to attribute the 
status of principle to any policy previously recognised as informing vicarious liability.  
Notably, although Lord Toulson recognised ‘enterprise risk’ as the concept which explained 
the ‘social underpinning of the doctrine of vicarious liability’, he did not think courts were 
required to conduct a ‘retrospective assessment of the degree to which the employee would 
have been considered to present a risk’.62   Instead, Lord Toulson chose to adopt a broad 
general principle to inform the ‘close connection’ test.  He held that whether the tortious 
conduct of an employee was sufficiently ‘closely connected’ with the employment for 
vicarious liability to be imposed was to be determined by identifying the ‘field of activities’ 
entrusted to the employee and then asking ‘whether it was right for the employer to be held 
liable under the principle of social justice’.63 
It is difficult to envisage how asking whether an employer should be held vicariously 
liable ‘under the principle of social justice’ would not lead to further expansion of the law, 
particularly where no attempt is made to identify what amounts to ‘social justice’ for the 
purposes of imposing vicarious liability or what limits should be placed on the imposition of 
such liability.64  As now apparent, Lord Toulson did not think it appropriate in Mohamud to 
explicitly recognise any such limits.  The potential for such expansion can readily be seen by 
contemplating a slight change in the facts of Mohamud.  Consider a situation in which the 
victim of a Mohamud type attack was not a customer, but a fellow employee of equal 
standing.  There is a consistent line of cases in which employers have avoided vicarious 
liability where an employee is injured as a result of a practical joke instigated by another 
employee.65  An exception has been made in circumstances where the instigator of the 
practical joke was a supervisor of the injured employee and the practical joke occurred in the 
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63 Ibid. 
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course of that supervision.66  Under the approach of Lord Toulson in Mohamud, however, 
such a distinction is at risk of being overlooked.  In both circumstances, the employees will 
be required to work together as part of their ‘field of activities’ and the practical joke may 
well form part of an ‘unbroken sequence of events’67 stemming from the commencement of 
that work.  The question of the nature of the relationship between the two employees will not 
arise. 
Concerns with the potentially expansive nature of the approach adopted by the UK 
Supreme Court in Mohamud are now also being expressed by lower courts in England and 
Wales.  The judge in Bellman v Northampton Recruitment Ltd,68 the first vicarious liability 
case decided after Mohamud, expressly noted the need for limits to be placed on the test for 
determining vicarious liability.  The case involved an assault which occurred after a work 
Christmas party.  At the conclusion of the official Christmas party, the staff moved on to 
another hotel.  At the hotel, and after a considerable number of drinks, the managing director 
of the company took offence to a comment made by one of the sales managers about how the 
company was being managed and assaulted him.  The sales manager was left severely injured 
and sought to hold the company vicariously liable for the actions of the managing director.  
Although it was possible to draw an ‘unbroken sequence of events’ from the work hosted 
Christmas party which fell within the managing director’s ‘field of activities’ to the 
conversation which led to the assault, the judge refused to impose vicarious liability.  In his 
view:69 
If the mere fact of a discussion being between employees and about work were enough for liability to 
arise, it would mean that such a company's potential liability would become so wide as to be potentially 
uninsurable. 
The judge was therefore keen to identify the outer limits of vicarious liability.  Not 
insignificantly, the judge found the means to do this by conducting a careful review of the 
facts and reasoning in similar cases of employee to employee assaults. 
 By drawing attention to methodology, the majority in Prince Alfred College have 
highlighted the possibility that what was driving the apparent expansion of vicarious liability 
identified by Lord Phillips in Various Claimants70 was an over-reliance on general principles 
as opposed to any deliberate attempt to expand the scope of vicarious liability more 
generally.71  Rather than risk such expansion in Australia, the majority of the High Court in 
Prince Alfred College opted to revert to the more traditional ‘bottom-up’ approach of 
devising specific legal principles from the facts of decided cases. 
(c) Lesson Three – An employer will be held strictly liable for the wrongdoing of an 
employee where that employee is placed in a position of ‘authority, power, trust, 
control [or] intimacy’ over a claimant 
The efforts of the majority in Prince Alfred College in utilising this ‘bottom-up’ 
approach should also not be ignored.  Leaving to one side the difficulties associated with the 
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occasion/opportunity distinction, the majority may be viewed as having identified a discrete, 
additional form of strict liability for the wrongdoing of another in tort.   Vicarious liability 
responds to the relationship between the employer and employee.72  The claimant may be a 
total stranger to both the employer and employee, and liability will still be imposed.  In 
contrast, the form of strict liability identified by the majority in Prince Alfred College 
responds to a pre-existing relationship between the defendant and the injured claimant.73  
Specifically, a relationship in which the defendant is in a position of ‘authority, power, trust, 
control [or] intimacy’74 in respect of the claimant.  Where the defendant subsequently puts a 
third party in a similar position of ‘authority, power, trust, control [or] intimacy’ in respect of 
the claimant, the defendant will be held strictly liable if that third party takes advantage of 
that position to wrongfully injure the claimant. 
The most significant feature of the discrete form of strict liability for the wrongdoing 
of another in tort75 identified by the majority in Prince Alfred College is that, unlike vicarious 
liability, it extends to intentional wrongdoing by the third party towards the claimant.  To 
understand why, it is necessary to examine the concept of ‘authority’ which signifies the 
types of relationships that attract this form of strict liability.76  Consider the relationship 
between a school and its students, which was the particular relationship under consideration 
in Prince Alfred College.  A school is vested with authority to direct the conduct of its 
students in order to effectively educate those students.  Given a school is not a natural person, 
those educational objectives would be unduly limited if only the school itself could exercise 
such authority.  Consequently, a school also has the capacity to confer its authority to direct 
the conduct of its students upon a third party, for instance, a teacher.  The capacity of a 
school to confer such authority upon a third party, however, is not without its problems.  
When a school confers its authority to direct the conduct of a student upon a third party, it 
creates a power relationship which did not previously exist.  This power relationship enables 
the third party upon whom authority has been conferred to direct the conduct of a student and 
creates an expectation that the student will obey.  As the third party upon whom authority has 
been conferred is not necessarily subject to the same restraints in the exercise of that 
authority as the school,77 there is significant potential for this power relationship to be 
abused.  A teacher, for instance, may direct a student to perform a scientific experiment, but 
fail to provide that student with appropriate safety equipment.78  Alternatively, a teacher may 
direct a student into a storeroom for the purposes of sexually assaulting that student.79  
Students are consequently put at risk of physical harm whenever their school confers upon a 
third party authority to direct the conduct of those students. 
It is this potential for a person upon whom authority has been conferred by a school to 
abuse the power relationship created by the school’s conferral of authority which arguably 
attracts the concern and the intervention of the law.  The discrete form of strict liability for 
the wrongdoing of another in tort identified by the majority in Prince Alfred College can be 
                                                            
72 P. Cane, Anatomy of Tort Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997), 46-47. 
73 (n 5) at [81]. 
74 Ibid at [82]. 
75 A form of liability I have previously described as ‘conferred authority strict liability’; C. Beuermann, 
‘Vicarious Liability and Conferred Authority Strict Liability’ (2013) 20(3) Torts Law Journal 265. 
76 Although it also can include the employment relationship, the relationship between state and prisoner and the 
relationship between bailor and bailee. 
77 Not being party to the relevant contract or the subject of the applicable legislation which is generally aimed at 
schools rather than individual members of the school. 
78 Williams v Eady (1893) 10 TLR 41. 
79 Lepore (n 9). 
seen to respond to the potential for abuse of the power relationship created by the school’s 
conferral of authority by holding the school liable regardless of personal fault for any harm 
wrongfully caused to a student by the third party upon whom authority has been conferred.  
The liability effectively holds a school to account for damage wrongfully caused to a student 
by a third party upon whom the school has conferred its authority to direct the conduct of the 
student.  In so doing, the liability provides students with a degree of protection from an abuse 
of the authority conferred by their school upon that third party.   
Importantly, ‘authority’ in this sense is distinct from the concept of ‘authorisation’ 
that historically underpinned the Salmond ‘course of employment’ test traditionally utilised 
in the second stage of determining vicarious liability.  ‘Authorisation’ refers, in general 
terms, to whether an employee has permission to engage in the particular conduct that 
resulted in harm to the claimant.  Its focus is the association between the directions issued by 
the employer to the employee and the wrongful conduct engaged in by that employee.  As 
such, it is limited by what conduct the employer has actually permitted (either expressly or 
impliedly)80 the employee to do.  In contrast, the concept of ‘authority’ utilised in the discrete 
form of strict liability for the wrongdoing of another in tort identified by the majority in 
Prince Alfred College is much broader and refers, in general terms, to a capacity to exercise a 
form of power or control over the claimant, whether that be a power to direct the claimant’s 
behaviour or control over the claimant’s property.  Its focus is not the conduct engaged in by 
the third party and whether such conduct was permitted by the defendant, but the 
vulnerability of the claimant to an exercise of the power conferred upon by the third party by 
the defendant.  As such, it is the claimant’s perception of the power being exercised that is 
important.  It follows, that it is the apparent and not the actual terms of the power conferred 
by the defendant upon the third party over the claimant that determines the scope of this 
second form of strict liability.  It is for this reason that the discrete form of strict liability for 
the wrongdoing of another in tort identified by the majority in Prince Alfred College can 
extend to intentional wrongdoing by the third party conferred the relevant authority by the 
employer or school.  Had there been evidence in Prince Alfred College that the claimant and 
the other year 8 boarders expected to be answerable to Bain as boarding house master when 
going to bed, the College would have more than likely, subject to resolution of the limitation 
period issue, been held strictly liable for the sexual abuse that resulted from Bain taking 
advantage of the position of power created by the College vis-à-vis the claimant. 
Recognition of the discrete form of strict liability for the wrongdoing of another in 
tort by the majority in Prince Alfred College is timely.  Coherency in the law rests on sound 
taxonomy and comparing like with like.  To the extent both the basis and scope of these two 
forms of strict liability for the wrongdoing of another in tort differ, they are distinct.  Having 
separated the two forms of strict liability, progress may now finally be made in identifying 
the otherwise illusive justification or justifications for imposing liability on a defendant 
regardless of personal wrongdoing.81   It may also prevent future courts falling into the trap of 
Mohamud82and extending the circumstances in which such an exceptional form of liability 
might be imposed on the basis of little more than a causal connection. 
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